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On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 1-08-cr-00218-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action 
Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
July 18, 2019 
Before:  JORDAN, GREENAWAY, Jr., and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 







Carlos Cegledi appeals from the denial of his motion for a reduction in sentence 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 




under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).  We will affirm. 
I. 
In 2009, Cegledi was convicted of federal drug offenses.  His Sentencing 
Guidelines range was 292 to 365 months of imprisonment, but the District Court 
sentenced him only to 234 months.  We affirmed.  See United States v. Cegledi, 441 F. 
App’x 870, 874 (3d Cir. 2011). 
Cegledi later filed the § 3582(c)(2) motion for a reduction in sentence at issue 
here.  He relied on Amendment 782, which lowered the base offense level for certain 
drug crimes.  Application of Amendment 782 would have lowered Cegledi’s Guidelines 
range to 235 to 293 months.  The District Court appointed counsel pursuant to its 
standing order regarding Amendment 782, but the District Court later permitted counsel 
to withdraw.  The District Court then denied Cegledi’s motion.  Cegledi appeals.1 
II. 
The District Court concluded that Cegledi is not eligible for a reduction in 
sentence on the basis of Amendment 782.  We agree.  Amendment 782 applies 
retroactively, and it lowers Cegledi’s Guidelines range.  Under the applicable Guidelines 
                                              
1 The District Court’s order granted Cegledi a certificate of appealability (“COA”).  The 
grant of a COA appears to have been inadvertent because a COA is not required to appeal 
the denial of a motion under § 3583(c)(2).  See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (requiring a 
COA to appeal “the final order in a proceeding under § 2255”).  In any event, we have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  In light of the District Court’s grant of a COA, our 
Clerk notified Cegledi that the Court would consider appointment of counsel for this 





policy statement, however, and except in circumstances not presented here, “the court 
shall not reduce the defendant’s term of imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and 
this policy statement to a term that is less than the minimum of the amended guideline 
range[.]”  U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(2)(A).  Thus, this provision “prohibits a reduction below 
the low end of a prisoner’s new range, even if the prisoner originally received a below-
Guidelines sentence.”  United States v. Berberena, 694 F.3d 514, 518-19 (3d Cir. 2012). 
In this case, Amendment 782 lowers Cegledi’s Guidelines range to 235 to 293 
months.  The District Court, however, sentenced Cegledi to 234 months, which is less 
than the minimum of Cegledi’s amended Guidelines range.  Consequently, Cegledi is not 
eligible for a reduction in his sentence under § 3582(c)(2). 
We briefly address two other issues.  First, Cegledi argued in response to his 
counsel’s motion to withdraw below that the District Court granted a two-level variance 
and that, with the same variance, his new sentencing range under Amendment 782 would 
be 188 to 235 months.  Cegledi did not provide any details about this alleged variance, 
and we see no indication that the District Court granted one.  See Cegledi, 441 F. App’x 
at 873-74 (discussing the basis for Cegledi’s sentence and rejecting his argument that the 
District Court should have granted him a variance).  In any event, the fact remains that 
Cegledi received a sentence that is lower than his sentencing range under Amendment 
782. 
Second, policy statement § 1B1.10(b)(2)(A) was amended as part of  
Amendment 759 in 2011 after Cegledi committed his offenses.  See Berberena, 694 F.3d 
at 518.  Before that amendment, District Courts had the discretion to reduce a sentence 
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under § 3582(c)(2) in Cegledi’s situation (though doing so “generally would not be 
appropriate”).  Id. at 518 & n.4.  Now they no longer do.  See id. at 518-19.   
Cegledi has not argued that application of the 2011 version of the policy statement 
constitutes an ex post facto violation, and it does not.  Amendment 782 on which Cegledi 
relies also was enacted after his offenses, so applying the 2011 version of § 
1B1.10(b)(2)(A) does not deprive him of any sentencing relief for which he was eligible 
at that time.  See United States v. Thompson, 825 F.3d 198, 205-06 (3d Cir. 2016); see 
also United States v. Alvaran-Velez, 914 F.3d 665, 669 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (citing 
Thompson and joining “the unanimity of circuits” in holding that application of the 2011 
version of § 1B1.10(b)(2)(A) is not an ex post facto violation).  Amendment 782 also was 
enacted after the 2011 amendment of § 1B1.10(b)(2)(A), so the 2011 version of § 
1B1.10(b)(2)(A) “merely operates to deny [Cegledi] the benefit of a sentence reduction to 
which [he has] never been entitled.”  Thompson, 825 F.3d at 206 n.10. 
III. 
For these reasons, we decline to appoint counsel for Cegledi in this appeal, and we 
will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
